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Embodied knowledge and sensory 
information: Theoretical roots and 
inspirations 
Andrew M. Cox, a.m.cox@sheffield.ac.uk 
Abstract 
This review paper examines some of the main theoretical influences prompting a re-
appreciation of the importance of the body and how it may be conceived as relevant to 
Information Studies (IS). It starts by placing this increased recognition of the body in its historical 
and social context. It then examines, in turn, how the body is viewed in the phenomenology of 
Merleau-Ponty; practice theory; embodied cognition; and sensory studies. Existing and potential 
influences in Information Studies are discussed. Most work that reexamines the place of the 
body reflects the influence of Merleau-Ponty, but he has had relatively little direct impact on IS. 
Practice theory does deal with the body and this has already been picked up quite strongly in IS 
Work in the area of embodied cognition has the potential to fundamentally change our view of 
the relation of the mind and the body, and information as an aspect of that. Sensory studies 
offers a powerful framework for examining the cultural shaping of the senses as a source of 
information. The implications of the bodily turn for methodology are briefly discussed. 
The bodily and sensory turns 
In the 1980s and 1990s in a number of academic disciplines, such as sociology, geography, 
history and anthropology, it began to be recognised that the body had been neglected and 
under-theorised (Shilling, 2007; Pink, 2015; Howes, 2013b). This neglect seemed to reflect the 
longstanding Cartesian mind-body dualism in Western culture that privileges thought over the 
supposedly separate and lower functions of the body. Such a depreciation of the body must also 
reflect the influence of strands in Christianity that tend to view the body as base and sinful. 
These assumptions could also be seen as shaping the way that in Information Studies (IS) we 
have generally privileged textual information and rationalistic approaches to gathering and using 
information (Lloyd, 2010).   
 
As these assumptions came under challenge socially and intellectually during the Twentieth 
Century, scholars in a number of subjects began to re-evaluate the importance of the body in 
their field. Yet to date, such a re-evaluation has only been reflected in a rather limited way in IS 
/OR\G&R[*ULIILQDQG+DUWHO7KLVLVQRWDOWRJHWKHUVXUSULVLQJJLYHQ,6¶VVWDUWLQJ
point in the study of library users and the information behaviour of academics and scientists and 
its deep engagemeQWZLWKWKHVWXG\RIWKHVXSSRVHGO\GLVHPERGLHG³YLUWXDO´H[SHULHQFHVRIWKH
internet. But as we enter a post-digital world the timing for a reconsideration in IS may be right. 
As the digital comes to be ubiquitously woven into the fabric of the everyday material and 
embodied world, the value and meaning of an exclusive focus on the purely digital collapses. 
Everyday information gathering and use has become more central to IS. These issues of Library 
Trends are dedicated to exploring what IS can gain through a greater recognition of the role of 
the body in our field. 
 
The bodily turn in social sciences and the humanities from the 1980s has been recognised to 
arise from a number of social and intellectual trends (Shilling, 2007; Nettleton and Watson, 
1998). Jütte (2005) traces a rediscovery of the senses throughout the Twentieth Century: the 
DUULYDORID³KDSWLFDJH´DSSDUHQWLQDQLQWHUHVWLQERG\WKHUDSLHVDQGFKDQJLQJVH[XDOPRUHV
the revalorisation of the sense of taste in a growing culinary pluralism; and the increasing 
cultural significance of sound through the centrality of music within popular culture. There is 
clearly a link to consumer culture: marketing often focuses on the sensual and affective appeal 
of a product on the assumption that this bypasses reasoned choice (Howes and Classen, 2014). 
Equally the 1960s reaction against consumerism included various movements exploring new 
experiences of the body, e.g. through diet and exercise or even through experimenting with 
drugs. The body is central to the modern project of reflexive identity (Shilling, 2007).The greying 
of the population, increasing experiences of living with chronic health conditions, new 
perspectives on disability, and new medical technologies have all brought into question our 
assumptions about the body. Another very important strand in the rethinking of the body, is how 
second wave feminism has challenged the gendered constructions of the body underlying 
patriarchy, with its links to definitions of sexuality and race. As such a renewed focus on the 
body is an important critical turn. 
 
However, not all social currents point towards a greater importance being given to the body. For 
example, the shift in the character of work in Western societies away from manual and craft 
labour towards ³NQRZOHGJHZRUN´LVDPDMRUUHDVRQZK\WKHERG\PLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHGWREHRI
decreasing theoretical importance. Similarly, the rise of the digital seems to reinforce 
GLVHPERGLPHQW7KHVHWZRWUHQGVDUHVSHFLILFDOO\FHQWUDOIRU,6¶VRQ-going blindness to the 
body. 
 
Furthermore, within a re-theorisation of the body, there are a number of very divergent 
intellectual currents (Gärtner, 2013). Often the concern has primarily been with the way the 
body is shaped and controlled by structures of power, but neglecting embodied being and 
sensory experience (Vannini et al., 2012; Hockey and Allen-&ROOLQVRQ)RXFDXOW¶VWKRXJKW
KDVEHHQDQREYLRXVLQIOXHQFHRQWKLVHPSKDVLV$IXUWKHU³VHQVRU\WXUQ´ZRXOGPRYHDZD\
IURPWKH³LQVFULEHGVRFLDOLVHGSDVVLYHERG\´DQGGR³MXVWLFHWRLWVDFWLYHVHQVXRXVSURGXFWLYH
QDWXUH´UHFRJQLVLQJWKHERG\DV³DIHHOLQJWKLQNLQJGHVLULQJZLOOLQJYLWDOPDWHULDODJHQW´
2¶/RXJKOLQ 
 
These special issues of Library Trends bring together work by IS scholars who are beginning to 
explore the productive role of the body in information activities. They come from a variety of 
metatheoretical and methodological traditions; encompass a wide range of study settings; and 
often explore new methods. This introduction analyses some of the wider intellectual context for 
their work, without attempting to do so comprehensively. It seeks to chart the linkages and 
discontinuities between some of the major influences that are shaping this bodily and sensory 
turn, and to map at a high level what may be a gathering influence on IS. 
The phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty 
An important reference point for any revaluation of the body and its relation to the mind is the 
work of the French Twentieth Century phenomenological philosopher, Maurice Merleau-Ponty. 
Phenomenology is a philosophical movement concerned with the study of how phenomena 
appear to us: the structure and nature of consciousness. A complex body of thought, it has a 
QXPEHURIVWUDQGVRU³WUDLOV´Allen-Collinson, 2009; Cibangu and Hepworth, 2016). Allen-
Collinson (2009) positions Merleau-Ponty within existential phenomenology, the branch 
concerned with what it is to be human; Cibangu and Hepworth (2016) locate him in a tradition of 
embodied phenomenology. 
 
For Merleau-Ponty (2012) in his major work originally published at the end of the second world 
war Phenomenology of Perception, perception is not the passive receipt of atomistic sensory 
signals (as often pictured in cognitive psychology), rather a process of active intentional 
interpreting (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011a). Our attention to the world is directed to doing 
something in a particular situation. We perceive the world as opportunities to act (an idea 
Merleau Ponty took from Gestalt psychology).This is not necessarily conscious intention: 
Merleau-Ponty is concerned with a pre-reflective, motor intentionality. Such potential actions are 
LPSOLFLWO\GHILQHGE\RQH¶VERG\LQUHODWLRQWRDQREMHFWQRWMXVWE\WKHREMHFWVWKHPVHOYHV7KXV
how one sees a chair, as something to sit on, is influenced by the nature of the human body 
shape, for which sitting is a relevant DFWLRQ³:KDWDSHUFHLYHUVHHVRQDQ\SDUWLFXODURFFDVLRQLV
WKHUHVXOWRIZKDWVKHFDQGR´5RPGHQK-Romluc, 2011a). Since perceptions are opportunities 
WRDFWDQGDFWLRQVERGLO\WKHVXEMHFWRISHUFHSWLRQDFWLRQLVHPERGLHG7KHWHUPWKH³OLYHG
ERG\´UHIHUVWRWKHQRWLRQWKDWZHDUHDERG\UDWKHUWKDQWKDWZH³KDYH´RQH,WDOVRIROORZVWKDW
people (and other beings) can see the same thing differently. Since perception is interactive and 
linked to action, there is not an objective, correct perception of an object. Rather Merleau-Ponty 
SURSRVHVWKHQRWLRQRI³0D[LPXPJULS´DVDSRVLWLRQLQJRIDQRSWLPDOUHODWLRQEHWZHHQSHUFHLYHU
and perceived object. He suggest that one feels a tension until one has moved into this position 
of maximum grip, and then when one has found the right place one attains a sense of 
HTXLOLEULXP³)ORZ´LVVNLOOHGSRVLWLRQLQJ 
 
Once a motor skill has been learned the body knows it and can act appropriately without 
thought (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011a). This is not mere habit, marked by unthinking repetition of 
WKHVDPHDFWLRQLWLVD³G\QDPLFWUDLW´WKDWLVDGMXVWHGDSSURSULDWHO\WRWKHFRQWH[W$QQDV
,WLV³SUDFWLFDOH[SHUWLVH´$QQDV 
³$FFRUGLQJWR0HUOHDX-Ponty, in everyday, absorbed, skillful coping, acting is 
experienced as a steady flow of skillful activity in response to one's sense of the 
situation. Part of that experience is a sense that when one's situation deviates from 
some optimal body-environment relationship, one's motion takes one closer to that 
optimum and thereby relieves the "tension" of the deviation. One does not need a goal 
or intention to act. One's body is simply solicited by the situation to get into equilibrium 
ZLWKLW´'UH\IXV 
To illustrate this Dreyfus (1996) quotes a basketball player reflecting that often it is only after 
playing the ball, that he realises consciously that he has acted. In this view the body rather than 
the mind is the primary site of knowing about the world. The body knows. The typist has 
³NQRZOHGJHLQWKHKDQGV´0HUOHau-Ponty 2012 quoted Romdenh-Romluc, 2011b:82).  One can 
know how to do things without being able to state the principles that underlie them; equally one 
can state the principles without being able to know how to actually do the activity (Keat, 1984). 
We have a non-representational, non-propositional, pre-linguistic experience of the world.  
 
Some aspects of this are familiar in IS through the notion of tacit knowledge. But since for 
Merleau-Ponty our experience of the world is primarily embodied, the central concern in IS with 
codification of tacit knowledge seems misdirected. In Merleau-Ponty the embodiment of the 
VXEMHFWLVFRUHDQGKXPDQOLIHLVIXQGDPHQWDOO\FRUSRUHDO2¶/RXJKOLQVXJgests that 
³UHDVRQLQJDQGFRJQLWLRQDUHLQIDFWVSHFLDOLVHGIXQFWLRQVRIRXUEDVLFERGLO\µGULYHV¶GLVWLOOHGDQG
UHILQHGRYHUWLPH´7KLVZRXOGVHHPWRMXVWLI\JLYLQJHPSKDVLVWRWKHZD\WKHERG\LWVHOIWDNHV
on and uses information, less exclusive focus on self conscious information gathering. 
 
Influentially, Merleau-Ponty also sees sensory experiences as integrated, and affect as part of 
perception. Thus we experience the senses in a holistic way, not as a series of discrete signals 
(Romdenh-Romluc, 2011b). When a dog barks we see a barking dog, not an image of a dog 
opening and shutting its mouth and separately some sounds. We also directly perceive the 
barking dog as frightening. We do not somehow process the information and draw a deduction 
that the combination of signals indicates a threat (Romdenh-Romluc, 2011a).  
 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VDUJXPHQWVDUHUHIHUHQFHGZLGHO\DFURVVOLWHUDWXUHVRIWKHERG\Inevitably, they 
are not without their problems. Howes and Classen (2014) mock the wordiness of 
phenomenology, which purports to be about human fleshly experience but ends up expressed in 
long-winded textual accounts. Critically its method of reflecting on individual subjectivity 
potentially neglects how cultural influences might shape such experiences. Thus some of 
Merleau-3RQW\¶VFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIH[SHULHQFHQHJOHFWVPRGDOLWLHVRISHUFHSWLRQWKDWZHUH
arguably less available to him as a male, e.g. experiences of vulnerability (Keat, 2013). 
However, there have been applications of phenomenology in general by later authors that 
DFNQRZOHGJHERGLHVDV³VRFLDOO\- and historically-located, socially related and interacting from 
SDUWLFXODUVWUXFWXUDOVWDQGSRLQWV´$OOHQ-Collinson, 2009). 
 
The relevance of phenomenology as a whole to IS is summarised by Budd (2004) and Cibangu 
and Hepworth (2016) - though these accounts do not give much weight to Merleau-Ponty 
because there are more obviously relevant approaches to the study of documents (Trace, 
2017). Yet in re-evaluations of the role of the body Merleau-3RQW\¶VLQIOXHQFe is pervasive, and  
he is an important influence on the authors in this special issue. It prompts us to place the body 
as central to human experience, and so also information activities; it breaks down the 
separation of cognition, motive, perception and emotion; it recognises the importance of the 
knowledge the body itself has. The gap between this and the typically rationalistic models of 
information seeking we are used to using seem to demand a rethinking of our assumptions in 
IS. 
 
Practice theory  
Another potential starting point for revising our understanding of the role of the body is practice 
WKHRU\7KHFHQWUDOLW\RIWKHERG\IRUSUDFWLFHWKHRULVWVLVFOHDUIURP6FKDW]NL¶VGHILQLWLRQ
RISUDFWLFHVDV³ERGLO\GRLQJV and sayings´RU5HFNZLW]¶V002: 251) description of them as 
³URXWLQL]HGERGLO\DFWLYLWLHVUHJXODUskillful SHUIRUPDQFHRIKXPDQERGLHV«PHQWDODQG
emotional activities which are - on a certain level - ERGLO\DVZHOO´%XWLISUDFWLFHWKHRU\GRHV
recognise the importance of the body in a general way, there is typically a lack of detail about 
what this means in its theorising, as a number of authors have pointed out (e.g. Maller, 2017; 
<DNKOHI*lUWQHU3UDFWLFHWKHRU\¶VHPSKDVLVLVRIWHQRQVXFKPDWWHUVDVWKHVRFLDO
nature of learning or on the active character of artefacts in the context of materiality, rather than 
on the lived body. Thus in a major work such as The Site of the Social  Schatzki (2002) says 
little specific about the embodied; it is not greatly differentiated from other materiality (though 
VHH6FKDW]NL1LFROLQL¶VFRPSUHKHQVLYHVXPPDU\RISUDFWLFHWKHRULHVVLPLODUO\
reveals that artefacts have been a lot more of interest than sensing or knowing bodies. 
 
Some notable exceptions to this relative neglect or lack of detail among practice theorists are in 
the work of Bourdieu, and also in some later authors, such as Strati and Yakhlef. One of 
%RXUGLHX¶VPRVWLPSRUWDQWFRQFHSWVLVKDELWXVGHHSO\LQWHUQDOLVHGGXUDEOHPRWLYDWLRQDODQG
thought structures, derived from wider social (class) structures which are dispositions that shape 
LQGLYLGXDODFWLRQ7KURRSDQG0XUSK\%RG\KH[LVLV%RXUGLHX¶VWHUPIRUZKHUHWKHVH
structures are written onto bodies (Throop and Murphy, 2002). Habitus is linked to the 
routinisation of behaviour and tacit knowledge, though such knowledge is probably tacit 
because it never was conscious knowledge. What makes habitus such an interesting idea is the 
way that social assumptions are inscribed onto bodies or internalised into minds, creating 
apparently spontaneous responses, as the influences on us disappear from view as bodily 
habits and common sense assumptions. But the problem here for modern sensibilities is that 
habitus as thus conceived could be seen as rather deterministic, static and outside 
consciousness (Noble and Watkins, 2003). It lacks a sense of the complex way habitus shapes 
action, how it can change and also be actively reflected upon. Illustrating this critique through 
the learning of sporting skills, Noble and Watkins (2003) suggest Bourdieu mistakes a growing 
automaticity through habituation, with lack of access to consciousness. In that sense Merleau-
3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWRIWKHURXWLQLVDWLRQRISUDFWLFDOH[SHUWLVHLVSUREDEO\PRUHDWWUDFWLYH 
 
A number of later authors within the practice tradition have drawn on Merleau-Ponty to say more 
about the role of the body in knowledge, notably Strati (2007) and Yakhlef (2010). Strati (2007), 
IRUH[DPSOHZULWHVDERXWWKH³VHQVLEOH´QDWXUHRINQRZLQJ6KRZLQJDstrong influence from 
Merleau-Ponty, he demonstrates that the body learns to know some things through doing rather 
than through reasoning. He ties this knowing to emotion and aesthetics. He draws on examples 
of how within specific practices we learn to know how to interpret certain forms of sensory data 
in very particular types of way. His examples are taken from physical activity/skills and see what 
the body knows as existing as well as what the mind knows. A further leap is possible if, as 
Gärtner (2011) argues, we recognise that our abstract cognitive representations might also draw 
on bodily experience. At this point the dualism between cognition and the body collapses, a 
point developed in the next section. 
 
Practice theory has been adopted by a number of authors in IS, but most notably and 
influentially, by Lloyd (2009, 2010). Lloyd (2010) emphasises the importance of the body in 
information literacy, again drawing on Merleau-Ponty, among other influences.  
Her empirical work reveals the importance of learning to interpret information from the different 
senses to achieve competence in practices such as ambulance work (Lloyd, 2009). Skills 
learned in the classroom or through reading texts need to be translated to embodied 
understanding. In the field it is vital that the practitioner acquires an understanding for the subtle 
sensory information that helps interpret the situation. She also points to the way patterns of 
practice inscribed on bodies can be read by others, as a source of information. In identifying 
corporeal information as an important modality of information, and exploring its dynamic relation 
in learning to textual and social modalities of information, she has produced what is already an 
influential framework for examining information landscapes and competencies within practices 
/OR\G6HYHUDODXWKRUVLQWKLVFROOHFWLRQWDNH/OR\G¶VZRUNDVDVWDUWLQJSRLQW 
Embodied cognition  
Somewhat influenced by Merleau-Ponty, as well as other strands of philosophical thinking 
(Leitan and Chaffey, 2014), another important area of work reevaluating the importance of the 
ERG\LVDURXQGWKHQRWLRQRI³HPERGLHGFRJQLWLRQ´ZKLFKLVEHLQJGHYHORSHGLQWKHILHOGVRIWKH
philosophy of the mind, cognitive science, but also artificial intelligence, neuroscience and 
linguistics. Traditionally reasoning was often seen as happening in a centralised way in the 
brain, working at an abstract level, consciously, through language, and rather removed from the 
processes of immediate perception. Embodied cognition represents a range of work that in 
contrast points to the way that parts of the body other than the brain are involved in cognition 
and working at an unconscious level, are bound up with perception, movement and action. Thus 
WKH³(PERGLPHQW7KHVLV´LVWKDW³PDQ\IHDWXUHVRIFRJQLWLRQDUHHPERGLHGLQWKDWWKH\DUH
deeply dependent upon characteristics of the physical body of an agent, such that the agent's 
beyond-the-brain body plays a significant causal role, or a physically constitutive role, in that 
DJHQW
VFRJQLWLYHSURFHVVLQJ´:LOVRQ	)RJOLD,WLVRQHRIDQXPEHURILQWHUUHODWHG
theories that challenge the notion that cognition happens purely in the brain.  
 
One form of the thesis refers to the way we think by actively engaging with the world. So we do 
not think separately from the state of our body. Experimental examples show that responses to 
a question differ depending on what physical tasks the body is performing when the question is 
posed. For example, evaluations of something are more positive if we are asked to do the 
evaluation while pushing upwards on a table (Robbins and Aydede, 2009). Thus in real time the 
UHVWRIRXUERG\EH\RQGRXUEUDLQLVLQYROYHGLQWKLQNLQJ³*HVWXUDOFRJQLWLRQ´UHIHUVWRthe way 
that our physical gestures while talking and thinking are part of our thought (Johnson, 2017). 
Gesture is not solely about communicating ideas to others, it would appear it is an active part of 
the cognitive process (Goldin-Meadow, 1999; Pouw et al. 2014). This is one example of the way 
that rather than thinking being centralised in the brain, it is distributed around the body. It works 
partly unconsciously, and not just through symbolic systems. The characteristics and 
capabilities of the body thus shape reasoning. 
 
Even more fundamental is the notion that the representations used in mental cognition are 
ultimately grounded in our embodied experience of the world. A key source of this idea are 
/DNRIIDQG-RKQVRQ¶VFODLPVWKDWERGLO\PHWaphors underlie most reasoning 
³HPERGLHGUHDOLVP´:LOVRQVHHVWKLVDVWKHOHDVWGLVFXVVHGEXWSRWHQWLDOO\PRVW
powerful version of the notion of embodied cognition, for it asserts that the concepts we use in 
abstract thinking are actually founded on bodily experience. Abstract concepts are understood 
through metaphors of embodied experience, and so based  on how we as humans interact with 
the environment. For example, our abstract understanding of the concept of balance or 
equilibrium, ultimately is as a metaphor drawing on the physical experience of balancing our 
body (Gärtner, 2011). This claim solves the longstanding philosophical conundrum of how it is 
possible that we can attach meaning to mental representations, by suggesting that we derive 
them from our bodily understanding of things (Robbins and Aydede, 2009). Thus while much of 
the work from Merleau-Ponty is about motor skills, here all the working of cognition, including 
high order abstract reasoning are seen to be founded on bodily experience. Such a view should 
have a radical impact on how we view mental thought processes, including those implicated in 
information. 
 
Embodied cognition is one of a number of theoretical strands that challenge the view that 
cognition happens purely in the brain, such as embedded and extended (or distributed) 
cognition, and which collectively are sometimes labelled situated cognition. Embedded cognition 
suggests that cognitive activity cannot be understood separately from the given structures of the 
physical or social environment. We partly think by offloading some of the effort onto the 
environment. Examples of these are epistemic actions, which are actions that help someone 
think about a problem (Robbins and Aydede, 2009). For example, in trying to pack a suitcase, 
organising items in some sort of order on the floor helps work out how to fit them in, rather than 
WU\LQJWRZRUNRXWKRZWRRUJDQLVHWKHPSXUHO\LQRQH¶VPLQG7KHQRWLRQRIH[WHQGHGFRJQLWLRQ
suggests that thinking involves things beyond the individual organism, including others: socially 
distributed cognition (Hollan, Hutchins and Kirsh, 2000). The cognitive process of navigating a 
ship is coordinated across a number of individuals and tools, rather than happening within an 
individual mind. Collectively embodied, embedded and extended cognition are sometimes 
referred to as situated cognition. By virtue of their embodied, embedded and extended nature, 
cognitive processes are dependent on the situation. We might have different thought processes 
depending on our bodily/other situation. Moving around a room to think about how the furniture 
might be laid out. 
 
,QWKHOLJKWRIWKHQRWLRQRIHPERGLHGFRJQLWLRQ,6¶VUHODWLYHQHJOHFWRIWKHERG\VHHPV
increasingly problematic. Some of the work in the area of situated and distributed cognition will 
be familiar to those working in IS, eg through the work of authors such as Suchman (1987), 
Lave (1988) and Hutchins (1995). Collectively it seems to offer an interesting perspective on the 
context of information behaviour. Another area where these theories have had a marked 
influence in the broad field of IS is in the understanding of the embodied aspects of reading 
(McLaughlin, 2015) and especially how reading changes when digital devices replace the 
printed book (Glenberg, 2011; Mangen, 2008, 2014; Mangen and Schilhab, 2012). Lueg 
(2014,2015) is one of the few authors who have begun to directly think through the implications 
of embodied cognition for information behaviour. He draws out the impact of the fact that human 
bodies are different from each other and this can affect information experience. Even something 
as simple as body height impacts what is perceived. Our perceptions are also influenced by the 
situation, including the task. Some sensory information is simply ignored. The peculiarities of the 
processes of perception need to be considered in how people gather information. 
 
The implications of embodied cognition are profound, for example consider the importance of 
the body to learning (Rambusch and Ziemke, 2005). We learn through movement and gesture. 
Many authors have noted the way that walking changes thought patterns and aid creativity 
(Clughen, 2014; Keinänen, 2016). Learning may be enhanced by certain physical practices that 
promote bodily awareness (Claxton, 2015). This suggests the body and its movement are likely 
to integral to collecting and interpreting information. In turn this could impact on our view of how 
space as part of the environment shapes information use, as it does reading and learning. 
Different spaces engender different styles of reading (McLaughlin, 2015). For example, the 
sensory experience of libraries is central to their role as places to read and undertake other 
informal learning tasks (Cox, 2017). Indeed, from this perspective the embodied nature of 
learning is applicable to traditional academic tasks and the traditional domains of information 
literacy, as it is to the context of professional practice so emphasized by Lloyd. 
 
Sensory Studies  
Gärtner (2011) offers a useful recent synthesis of the thought of Merleau-Ponty, practice theory 
and embodied cognition. Nevertheless, his account of bodily experience remains at a high level 
RIDEVWUDFWLRQ$QDOWHUQDWLYHVWDUWLQJSRLQWPLJKWEH6HQVRU\6WXGLHV³DFXOWXUDODSSURDFKWRWKH
stud\RIWKHVHQVHVDQGDVHQVRU\DSSURDFKWRWKHVWXG\RIFXOWXUH´+RZHVb). In contrast 
to the mainstream treatment of perception in psychology that focuses on descriptions of 
supposedly universal mechanisms by which sensory information is processed, Sensory Studies 
reveals how in different societies different meanings are attached to the senses and the cultural 
significance of the way that the senses are placed in different positions in a hierarchy of 
importance.  
 
The roots of Sensory Studies lie in a sensory turn in history and social anthropology in the 
1980s and 1990s, though the term was not coined till 2006, associated with the founding of the 
journal The Senses and Society. Among historians it can be traced back to scholars in the 
Annales school, in particular to the work of Alain Corbin, and has been notably taken forward by 
Constance Classen (1993, 1994, 2012). Now there is a substantial body of historical work 
sharing these preoccupations, as reviewed by such authors such as Jütte (2005) and Smith 
(2007) and in the six volume Cultural history of the senses, edited by Classen (2014). Sensory 
anthropology emerged at the same time, challenging the tendency to over-emphasise cultures 
as texts. Anthropologists have explored the way different cultures attach different meanings and 
value to sensations such as smell, balance, hearing or heat (Classen, 1993; Howes and 
Classen, 2014). 7KHPHWKRGRI³SDUWLFLSDQWVHQVDWLRQ´GLVSODFHVSDUWLFLSDQWREVHUYDWLRQ¶V
privileging of sight (Howes, 2013a). Subsequently these interests have been picked up in other 
fields, such as geography and sociology (Howes, 2013a). 
 
The Sensory Formations series of monographs, which are interdisciplinary anthologies for 
example on auditory cultures (Bull et al., 2015), smell culture (Drobnick, 2006) and touch 
(Classen, 2005) are a useful entry point to this perspective on the study of the senses. Without 
universalising how these senses are experienced (or indeed how they are differentiated and 
named), they explore the range of meanings attached to particular sensory experiences in 
GLIIHUHQWKLVWRULFDODQGFXOWXUDOVHWWLQJV3RUWHXV¶006) analysis of smellscapes reprinted in 
Drobnick (2006), for example, captures certain unique features of the sense, such as the 
difficulty of locating smell, but also the variation in its meaning in different spaces and time. 
Such richness is lacking in the philosophical generalisations of phenomenology. It also 
challenges psychological explanations of perception or our tendency to interpret these 
sensations as purely private, subjective experiences. Rather these readings sensitise us to the 
precise cultural meanings attached to the senses in different contexts; and challenge the 
privileging of the visual as a means of knowing. Such exploration of the meaning of the senses 
is important to IS if ultimately the senses are an immediate, essential, if mundane source of 
information. 
 
7KHWLWOHRI+RZHVDQG&ODVVHQ¶VLQWURGXFWRU\WH[W³:D\VRIVHQVLQJ´UHIHUVWRWKHSOXUDO
ways in which senses as processes are experienced across societies and contexts. A central 
tenet of Sensory Studies it that it challenges the traditional categorisation of five senses. There 
are different categorisations at different historical periods or in different societies (Howes, 
2013b). For example, the very dimensions of touch or the haptic are multiple. Touching with 
hands is different from touching with other parts of the body; and also might not necessarily be 
differentiated from senses of the internal organs. Thus the very categorisation of the senses we 
take for granted is a cultural construct. The relation and interplay between the senses, 
³LQWHUVHQVRULDOLW\´LVDOVRLPSRUWDQWIRUWKHVHDXWKRUV+RZHVEDVLWZDVIRU0HUOHDX-
3RQW\7KHVHQVHVFDQEHDUUDQJHG´DPRUHRUOHVVV\QHUJHWLFDOO\EPRUHRUOHVV
KLHUDUFKLFDOO\DQGFPRUHRUOHVVLQWHUFRQQHFWHGO\´RUGPore or less simultaneously or 
sequentially. Senses can collaborate but may also conflict (Howes, 2013b). Exploring how 
meaning exists relationally between the senses is central to such studies.                                                             
 
Another central concern is how the social ranking of the senses is linked to structures of power 
LQVRFLHW\³(YHU\RUGHULQJRIWKHVHQVHVLVDWWKHVDPHWLPHDVRFLDORUGHULQJ´+RZHVb). 
Usually higher social groups become symbolically associated with what are deemed higher 
senses. Marginal groups resist such ordering. For example, Smith (2007) charts the changing 
meaning of touch in Western societies. Historically, touch has often been seen as a means of 
authentic access to knowledge. But there was a gradual denigration of the sense in the 
Enlightenment, as touch became DVVRFLDWHGZLWKGLVHDVHDQGWKH³EDVH´GULYHRIVH[XDOLW\
Sight became increasingly associated with reason, detachment, objectivity; touch with instinct. 
There were strong links between this sensory order and patriarchy (e.g. through medical 
practices), class divisions and the racist assumptions underlying imperialism. But these are not 
necessary associations. Indeed, something as close to reasoning as writing is itself tactile in 
nature (Classen, 2005). Thus in examining the experience of the senses we need to have a 
critical awareness of the power structures that shape them. 
 
Indeed a central debate in the field has been around the proposition that historical and cross 
FXOWXUDOFRPSDULVRQUHYHDODQ³RFXODUFHQWULVP´- a privileging of the visual - in Western thinking. 
McLuhan and Ong thought that shifts in communication media had made a major impact on the 
experience of the senses, creating a deeply significant split between oral societies, privileging 
speech, and visual societies, privileged the printed word. Hence printed text comes to be linked 
WRYLVLRQDQGWRUHDVRQREMHFWLYLW\7KLV³*UHDWGLYLGH´WKHVLVQRZDSSHDUVWRRVLPSOLVWLFD
binary, but has structured much of the debate (Smith, 2007). There may be many practices of 
looking; not all are modelled on detached observation.  
 
The text based methods of historical scholars could well have value in reconstructing the 
meaning of the relation of the information and the senses for IS. Some have been critical, 
however, of the way Howes sees the senses as essentially culturally formed allowing little room 
for individuality and creativity (Pink, 2015). 
 
If we are more concerned with contemporary sensory order, Vannini et al. (2012) offer a more 
sociological account of Sensory Studies. They coin a number of terms that provide a useful 
lexicon for those working in the field, including:  
Ɣ ³6RPDWLFZRUN´ZKLFKWKH\GHILQHDV³WKHUDQJHRIOLQJXLVWLFDQGDOLQJXLVWLFUHIOH[LYH
experiences and activities by which individuals interpret create, extinguish, maintain, 
interrupt, and/or communicate somatic sensations that are congruent with personal, 
LQWHUSHUVRQDODQGRUFXOWXUDOQRWLRQVRIPRUDODHVWKHWLFDQGRUORJLFDOGHVLUDELOLW\´
(Vannini et al., 2012: 19). On the surface this concept is quite hard to understand, but it 
emphasises the active nature of the senses as well as the combination of pre-linguistic 
DQGFXOWXUDOHOHPHQWVWKDWPDNHXSVHQVRU\H[SHULHQFH7KHQRWLRQWKDWWKH³VHQVHVDUH
VNLOOV´LVDKHOSIXOZD\LQWRWKLV9DQQLQLHWDO 
Ɣ 7KH³6HQVRU\ RUGHU´RU³WKHVHQVRULXP´9DQQLQLHWDOLVDFXOWXUDOPRGHORI
the meaning of the senses. We have already seen this in the work of Classen and 
Howes, but what Vannini et al. (2012) add is that this can exist at the level of a whole 
civilisation, one society or a small group, like their example of wine-tasters. Perhaps 
within specific practices the senses are experienced differently. That is the logic of 
Grasseni (2009) who writes about how the senses are trained eg in farming communities 
in the Alps. A community of practice could be a sensory community; a landscape of 
practice, could be a sensory landscape. 
Ɣ ³6HQVRU\FRPPXQLWLHV´- ³JURXSVRISHRSOHZKRVKDUHFRPPRQZD\VRIXVLQJWKHLU
VHQVHVDQGPDNLQJVHQVHRIWKHLUVHQVHV´9DQQLQLHWDO12: 7). 
Ɣ ³6HQVRU\VRFLDOLVDWLRQ´9DQQLQLHWDOZKLFKZRXOGEHWKHZD\RQHZRXOG
learn the meaning attached to sensory experiences in a particular context. 
Ɣ ³$VHQVXRXVVHOIDSHUIRUPDWLYHUHIOH[LYHSHUFHSWLYHLQWHQWLRQDOLQGHWHUPLQDWH
emergent, embodied being-in-the-ZRUOG´9DQQLQLHWDO7KLVFRQFHSWUHIHUVWR
the way sense of self emerges from sensory experiences, shaped within a wider culture. 
Ɣ 7KH³6RPDWLFFDUHHU´9DQQLQLHWDOWLHGWRWKHVHQVXRXVVHOILVWKHhistory or 
biography of sensuous experiences that constitute an important aspect of identity. 
 
As yet there have been few authors who have borrowed from this body of theory for IS. Yet 
WKHUHLVVLJQLILFDQWSRWHQWLDOLQ9DQQLQLHWDO¶VWHUPLQRORJ\Wo inspire a much closer 
investigation of the precise meaning and inter-relation of the meaning of sensory information in 
particular contexts, communities and practices, and how these relate to wider cultural identities. 
 
9DQLQLHWDOFDOOIRUD³VHQVXRXVVFKRODUVKLS´DWHUPILUVWXVHGE\6WROOHUIRU
research about, through and for the senses (Vannini et al., 2012: 63). This implies new methods 
to examine the senses, as well as investigating new types of activities. This is challenging given 
the ephemeral, unconscious and tacit qualities of much sensory experience (Borer, 2013). 
3LQN¶VSensory Ethnography is an influential guide to such methods. Interviewing and 
observation may still be important within such research practices. However, it might not be 
simply an interview taking place outside the context of interest: thus practices such as 
interviews walking with participants could be a valuable data collection tools to explore, 
soundscapes, smellscapes and touchscapes (Borer, 2013). Interviews could well involve 
elicitation, using photos or drawing (methods already of interest in IS (Hartel, 2014)) but also 
potentially sounds or smells (Pink, 2015). It is probably important to engage all the senses, 
given the intersensoriality of experience (Mason and Davies, 2009). Participant produced video 
and journaling have also been used. In terms of participant observation, auto-ethnographic 
PHWKRGVFRXOGEHLPSRUWDQWEXWWKHUHVHDUFKHUPD\DOVRQHHGWRWDNHD³VHQVRU\
DSSUHQWLFHVKLS´LQWRWKHVHnsorium of a particular sensory community (Pink, 2015). The sensory 
focus also implies new ways of presenting research outputs, be that through exhibitions, 
olfactory books or guided walks (Pink, 2015). 
Conclusion 
A number of very different streams of thought are flowing together to influence how the body is 
seen (Gärtner, 2013). This review has attempted to chart some of these, helping to map them 
out for readers. It has been far from comprehensive. There are many other potential influences 
from educational theorists such as Dewey through to feminist and critical theory. All prompt us 
to consider further the role of the body in information activities. Fully exploring the ramifications 
of these influences on information theory promises to be a rich area of work for some years. It is 
to be hoped that the collection of papers in this double issue will be a landmark in further 
stimulating such work. 
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